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Abstract. The topic of this article was inspired by a recent survey, carried out in several 
Western European countries, with the purpose of ascertaining the public’s expectations 
regarding the respective countries’ (and Europe’s) economic prospects for the first half 
of the 21st century. The questions were focused upon two chief issues: (1) Europe’s 
economic future within the context of contemporary global transformations; (2) the 
viability of the European economic systems. Concerning the former issue, one of the 
questions read: “Are you optimistic, pessimistic or neutral about the future of your 
country’s economy?” The French, Spaniards, Italians and even residents of the United 
States were rather skeptical at this point, the only optimistic being the Germans. To the 
question: “Do you think the European economy can compete effectively against other 
rising economies in Asia, such as China and India?”, distrust was even higher; over two 
thirds of the French interviewees gave a negative response. In the other countries, the 
skeptics’ share was lower but still higher than of those who answered affirmatively.1
If the above-mentioned answers could have, to a certain extent, been intuited, 
the questions regarding the latter issue yielded less predictable results. The subjects were 
asked to express a double option: between the capitalist economic system and other types 
of systems, on the one hand; between the European system of capitalism (admitting there 
is such a thing) and the American one, on the other hand. To the question: “Do you think 
a free-market, capitalist economy is the best economic system or not?”2, the majority of 
the interviewees (48 percent of the Germans, 49 percent of the Spaniards …etc.) gave 
affirmative answers, whereas regarding the type of capitalism they wished, most of the 
questioned European citizens rejected the United States’ economic system. 
Why is Europe pro-capitalist? It is most likely because its prosperity owes 
much more to capitalism that to any other economic system. Of no less importance is the 
fact that all of the practical experiments of socialism have wound up in complete failure 
so far. In spite of that, the ideological dispute between capitalism and socialism has 
known a remarkable revival lately, a number of reputed scholars trying to demonstrate 
that both systems possess viable elements that is worth transmitting to the future.  
Why is Europe anti-American? Answering this question is a bit more difficult. 
In the following pages, I’ll try to find some possible explanations.  
“THE DEFINITION OF CAPITALISM STILL ELUSIVE”
3  
Capitalism, as a theoretical concept, has always been difficult to define. In the course 
of the last one-and-a-half century – since it was first used by Marx until today – the term 
“capitalism” has never enjoyed a unanimously accepted definition. On the contrary, its use 
often triggered fierce ideological controversy. “The terms 'Capitalism' and 'Capitalistic 
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Production' are political catchwords. They were invented by socialists, not to extend 
knowledge, but to carp, to criticize, to condemn. To-day, they have only to be uttered to 
conjure up a picture of the relentless exploitation of wage-slaves by the pitiless rich. They are 
scarcely ever used save to imply a disease in the body-politic.” (Mises, 1951)  
The attempts to defend capitalism against its ”enemies” were unsuccessful because of 
the extraordinary force of socialist ideas, which had seized the masses’ consciousness during 
the last decades of the 19
th century. Thenceforth, capitalism would be defined preponderantly 
in opposition to socialism, obviously with the purpose to emphasize the latter’s virtues. Out of 
propagandistic reasons, not only the historical roots of capitalism but also its core principles 
and mechanisms would be systematically distorted by socialism’ advocates.  
CAPITALISM “UNDER ATTACK”… 
The necessity to defend capitalism against the numerous attacks and detractors is a 
theme that would recurrently appear in the liberal economic thought in the course of time. 
Actually, it would be reiterated by all Austrian School’s representatives. According to 
Friedrich Hayek for instance, “a lot of people would be surprised to learn that most of their 
beliefs about capitalism aren’t established facts but myths, fabricated for political purposes.” 
(Hayek, 1954)  Despite their determination in defending capitalism against the tide of 
mystifications of all sorts, the Austrians as well as other schools of thought of liberal 
orientation were nevertheless unable to stave off the hard influence of leftist radicalism, much 
less to mitigate rampant prejudice about capitalism’s “evils”. The establishment of the soviet 
state, followed soon after by the ascendance of Maoism would further foster socialist ideas, 
igniting spirits of solidarity all over Europe, especially on the Seine’s banks. Many a 
progressive French intellectual would be spellbound and start exalting the stately 
achievements of the young communist states, largely viewed as capable of more sustained 
economic growth and fairer distribution of economic results relative to capitalism, the latter 
being presented in an ever more biased and heavily politicized fashion.  
SOCIALISTS SEQUESTRATE THE FUTURE 
Yet with the time, such approaches became less and less persuasive. In fact, 
socialism’s proponents were, from the outset, confronted with a dilemma: how to make 
inherent weaknesses of capitalism – which, according to Marx, will lead to its ineluctable 
demise – match its epoch-making achievements that no-one could deny. After all, the 
twentieth century civilization had been entirely built on capitalist bases. Therefore, there had 
to be found a new, decisive element that should render socialism’s superiority unquestionable. 
Since this particular thing didn’t exist, it could only be borrowed from the future; that’s were 
the solution lied. After all, according to socialism’s apologists, the new system did not simply 
emerge spontaneously; it had to be built. In brief, what they basically proposed was an 
eschatological solution. 
This new tactic, relying on the relativity of the present and sequestration of the future 
was designed to release socialists from the increasing difficulty of explaining the hardships 
the system was being confronted with in practice. From the late 1970s on, no theoretical 
argument was strong enough to withstand reality: the conspicuous decline of communist 
societies, reflected in an ever more dented liberty, endemic poverty and widespread 
hopelessness. The gravity centre of ideological fight gradually moved away from the present 
toward the future, emphasis falling less on the past and present flaws of capitalism – from 
early capital accumulation to labor class pauperization to state-backed monopoly – and more 
on socialism’s extraordinary potential to secure humankind’s future progress.  
AN INESCAPABLE DILEMMA 
In this new stage, the criticism of capitalism in antithesis with socialism became less 
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secure future economic progress. “The really important point in discussing the economic 
merits of socialism is not that of comparing the equilibrium position of a socialist and of a 
capitalist economy with respect to social welfare. Interesting as such comparison is for the 
economic theorist, it is not the real issue in the discussion of socialism. The real issue is 
whether the further maintenance of the capitalist system is compatible with economic 
progress.” (Lange, 1937)  
The answer proposed by Lange to his own challenging question (quoted above) is of 
course, negative: capitalism as a system is, in spite of its past merits, incapable to bolster 
future economic development. Lange’s position relies on an older idea, exposed by Lionel 
Robins, according to which, in capitalism, there is striking incompatibility between the 
maintenance of the value of invested capital, on the one hand, and technical innovation, which 
leads to a decrease in costs, on the other hand. “The capitalist system seems to face an 
inescapable dilemma: holding back technical progress leads, through the exhaustion of 
profitable investment opportunities, to a state of chronic unemployment which can be 
remedied only by a policy of public investments on an ever-increasing scale, while a 
continuance of technical progress leads to the instability due to the policy of protecting the 
value of old investments which has been previously described.” (Lange, 1937) 
OLD AND NEW MYTHS 
Due to a systematic propaganda by radical leftist ideologues, the popular mythology 
about “rotten capitalism” and “wicked capitalists” became strongly anchored in the public 
consciousness and remained so until the present day, not only in Central and Eastern Europe – 
as one might expect – but, to a greater or lesser extent, in almost all Western European 
countries. Ironically enough, socialist ideas seem to have greater appeal to Western European 
high-schools and colleges then basic capitalist values. “A recent study of German high-school 
textbooks by the Institute for the German Economy in Cologne, found entrepreneurs – instead 
of getting credit for creating jobs – taking the blame for everything from unemployment to 
alcoholism to Internet fraud and cell-phone addiction.”
4 “Ask any European what he learned 
at school about how the economy works and you’ll likely hear a similar story.”
5
Since all these “truths” have been transmitted to the younger generations largely 
through the medium of school, it is no surprise that today, confusion among the youth is 
almost as high as it was in the 1960s. By then, a group of Marxist hardliners, led by Guy 
Debord and Jean Baudrillard inflamed young Parisians’ minds with revolutionary “ideas”, by 
depicting capitalism as a conventional spectacle, in which any genuine human experience will 
be turned into merchandise and then resold through publicity and mass media. According to 
Baudrillard, “the commodity has become so abstract that the economy is now nothing than a 
system of signs. The ‘needs’ that we express in the marketplace are not a reflection of any 
underlying set of real desires; they are simply a way of conceptualizing our participation in 
the symbolic system.” (Heath & Potter, 2005) 
 Although  vulgar  interpretations of this kind – reducing capitalism at a ‘system of signs 
and symbols’ – are no longer en vogue, the youth are still being told the same old story, 
especially in high-schools and colleges: “They taught us the market economy was a dangerous 
wilderness full of risk and bankruptcy…We never learned how prices affect supply and 
demand, only about evil managers and unjust wages.”
6 Last but not least, perhaps the clearest 
evidence of European higher education’s obtuseness as regards teaching economics during the 
post-world era was provided by the very University of Vienna, where “the works of the great 
Austrian school of capitalist thinkers were all but ignored for more than half a century.”
7    
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HISTORIANS LEND A HAND 
  Judging by the above aspects, the doctrinarian confrontation between capitalism and 
socialism seems endless and extremely hard to solve. However, when regarded through the 
eyes of historians, things will appear slightly different. Historians can have an ascendancy 
over economists, the latter being much too often inclined to overemphasize either mechanistic 
or normative aspects. Just to give an example, neo-classics – whose theoretical contribution 
could never be praised enough – were convinced their system was infallible. According to 
them, within a set of given hypotheses, a theoretical model of market economy would reach 
the Pareto optimal. It follows that considering other organization patterns is not necessary, 
since none could outperform the market system. (Nelson, 2003)  
By contrast, historians’ vision is less biased and therefore, integrating and 
reconciliatory. “Capitalism is unconceivable without an active complicity on the part of 
society. Obviously it is a reality of a social and political kind and even a reality of civilization, 
because it is necessary that society, more or less consciously, should accept its values.” 
(Braudel, 1985) The famous French historian thus shifts the discussion onto a different plan. 
Although his position is not a direct conduit to reconciliation, it will nevertheless induce 
thinkers to attempt to bridge gaps and seek common points.  
MARKET SOCIALISM…A SOLUTION? 
Market socialism thus stemmed from this particular dilemma: how to overcome the 
limits of market economy, highlighted by Nelson, without forsaking the values of capitalism, 
referred to by Braudel? The proponents of the new paradigm believe they found the formula 
by which the two systems, capitalism and socialism might cohabit. The basic idea is “to 
combine the efficiency of markets with the egalitarian goals of socialism.” (Milonakis, 2003) 
If, as Nelson put it, market economy cannot deal effectively with certain fields of economic 
activity such as public goods, socialism can. The solution then must reside in a hybrid system 
– significantly coined “competitive socialism” – that should combine capitalism’s chief values 
(e.g. competitive resource allocation) with socialism’s (especially, public property over means 
of production). (Bardhan & Roemer, 1992)  
  Briefly, we are now “on a fresh page of history”. (Sennett, 2006) Not only have both 
systems managed to survive to this day but they are now closer to each other than anytime in 
the past. A genuine illustration of this happy “marriage” is being showcased by present-day 
China, whose economy has scored unprecedented growth rates lately but where liberty 
remains shackled. Neither did Marx’s prophecies – regarding the unavoidable death of 
capitalism – materialize, nor did socialism die after the collapse of totalitarian regimes in the 
late 1980s. But this makes figuring the society of the future even more difficult. What will it 
be like? It won’t be capitalist, according to some. (Drucker, 1999) It won’t be socialist either, 
if we were to judge by the major tendencies that are manifest in today’s world, with China as 
the leading example. But then…what is it going to look like? 
 GLOBALIZATION AND ITS CHALLENGES  
  For the time being, we just know with pretty much certainty that Europe is, for its 
majority, pro-capitalist, at least according to declarations, surveys, press articles etc. 
However, most of its citizens dislike the American model of capitalism, considered 
incompatible with Europe’s traditions and culture. How could one characterize this peculiar 
attitude? Does it rely on a rationale or it’s merely Americano-phobia, in fact, a pretty 
widespread sentiment throughout Europe? Strange as it may be, according to surveys, 
Europeans generally reject the American model of capitalism, which they nonetheless admit 
to have been the most effective in generating prosperity so far. This recognition is official, as 
revealed by various EU documents, e.g. the Sinclair report, published in 2003:  ”Over the past 
fifteen years the European Union (EU) has witnessed a big leap forward in its integration 
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the more remarkable since it is relative not only to expectations but also to past European 
performance and to that of the United States…Further more, given that that the United States 
has achieved higher per capita growth relative to the EU through both higher levels of 
productivity and higher employment, this implies that the EU is actually operating inside the 
production possibility frontier or, in other words, is not using its resources to the full extent of 
their capacity.” (European Commission, 2004)  
  Why is the American model of capitalism so unpopular in Europe? Whatever the 
answer to this question, it will automatically draw the answerer into another type of dispute, at 
least as fierce as the historical fight between capitalism and socialism: the globalization 
“war”. Although written in inverted commas, the term “war” is not too hard; it expresses, 
literally, the manner in which the two opposing sides are interacting. What we are witnessing 
are not mere ideological confrontations but true guerilla warfare. “A guerilla army of anti-
trade activists took control of downtown Seattle today” – read a Washington Post headline 
during the violent clashes that accompanied the WTO summit in December 1999. (McNally, 
2002) Thus one can see the globalization war is more or less circumscribed to the free trade 
story, with the WTO acting the leading part. Yet this idea is dismissed by anti-globalization 
partisans, who claim globalization is not about free trade; rich countries which keep 
supporting it are no less protectionist today than they used to be three or four decades ago. 
According to them, the ”free trade myth” is a weapon the rich world is wielding with the aim 
of bolstering the interests of multinationals and hurting the poor economies. However, “there 
is a middle ground between the extreme positions between the free-traders and the anti-
globalizers. This middle ground recognizes that even if one accepts the ultimate desirability of 
free-trade, rushed liberalization may be harmful. Policies in the middle ground need to be 
found by investigating the effects of market failures on the experience of liberalization in 
different countries.” (Stiglitz & Charlton, 2005) 
  What is then the stake in the globalization war? Obviously, it’s the future of 
capitalism, under the auspices of which it is unfolding. It couldn’t possibly be otherwise. It is 
only a system of this kind – where the prevalence of private property is a guarantee for 
economic liberty – that could provide the required conditions for the unfettered movement of 
capital across national boundaries. From this standpoint, socialism could only accomplish a 
political globalization, probably very similar to the one the Soviets promoted during the 1960 
and 1970s. Socialism could reign but over a parochial and virtually collectivized world. If 
today’s capitalist-type globalization is gradually eroding the power of sovereign states – 
assertion that nonetheless contains a trace of truth – Soviet-type interventionism led to the 
proliferation of totalitarian regimes and the economic ruin of the countries that fell under its 
influence. 
 A MERICANS’ BATTERED UNILATERALISM 
The generalized aversion against the American model of capitalism is therefore, up to 
a certain degree, understandable. Many Europeans are perceiving globalization as a means to 
defend the US-based multinationals’ interests, thereby turning Europe into an annex of the 
United States’ economy. A number of unilateral actions, recently undertaken by the 
Americans largely contributed to the strengthening of this picture. In fact, according to 
American scholars, beginning with the second half on the 1980s, the US trade policy “had 
changed to embrace aggressive unilateralism”. (Bhagwati, 1995) The hassle around the Kyoto 
Protocol is a typical case in point. “The Bush administration did not merely reject the Kyoto 
Protocol; it declared that the United States would never sign the treaty and declined to offer 
an alternative approach to global warming until many months later. And the justification that 
was given – that the treaty was ‘not in the United States’ economic best interests – was 
unlikely to appeal to a world that knows the United States is both a wealthy country and the 
largest producer of greenhouse gases. The administration did not just announce that it would 
not ratify the agreement…it took the further (and unnecessary) step of ‘removing’ the earlier 124 SORIN BURNETE 
US ‘signature’ from the treaty and then launched an aggressive diplomatic campaign to 
compel other states to reject the convention as well.” (Walt, 2005) Clearly enough, such 
unilateral actions (to which, one might add others such as the boycotting of China’s and 
Russia’s accession to the WTO, the use of the famous Super 301 to adopt economic sanctions 
against Japan, India and Brazil in 1989, the pressures exercised several times upon the IMF to 
bail out certain economies from financial crises etc.) have constantly fed widespread hostility 
against the American superpower, perceived as a menace rather than a stability factor.  
GLOBALIZATION VIEWED AS AMERICANIZATION 
Since globalization is currently viewed as “the extension of capitalism throughout the 
world, whereas multinational corporations are seen as the B-52s of capitalism and its global 
reach” (Bhagwati, 2004) and because this extension is being orchestrated by America, thereby 
strengthening its role as a global superpower, it isn’t difficult to understand why anti-
globalization has come to be synonymous to anti-capitalism and further on, to anti-
Americanism. Unfortunately, this is not a simple syllogism; it’s a reality. However, these 
feelings are not made manifest everywhere in the same way but have taken a variety of forms. 
While in the Islamic world for example, America is generally identified with the symbol of 
Western civilization, usually considered as being opposed to Islam, in many other Afro-Asian 
countries, it is being blamed for a lot of ugly practices like neocolonialism and other forms of 
political domination.  
In Europe, anti-Americanism is more sweetened but no less biting and in most cases, 
unjustified. Although considered as “part of the family”, Americans are nevertheless often 
regarded with some kind of aristocratic superiority; actually, they are envied for their money 
but despised for being, allegedly, less cultivated. Moreover, throughout Europe, several types 
of Americano-phobia are to be encountered, the French variant being perhaps the toughest but 
also the most contradictory. Out of historical reasons, the French have always considered 
themselves morally obliged to defend the European values against the invasion of corporatist 
libertarianism (Korten, 1995), most of it of American origin. For nearly forty years, European 
anti-Americanism has swung between the “American defiance”, proclaimed during the 1960 
by Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber and the „anti-American obsession”, admirably explained 
by Jean-François Revel in his well-known work, published in the early 2000s. In the mean 
time, the sentiments vis-à-vis the colossus across the Atlantic gradually shifted from fear to 
reverence and sometimes, even to hatred. Europeans’ arrogance often prompted them to hold 
Americans responsible for most of their incapacities and failures. (Revel, 2002)    
WHY IS THE AMERICAN MODEL OF CAPITALISM UNPOPULAR? 
   Obviously, apocalyptic visions such as Servan-Schreiber’s are no longer credible. 
Since the 1980s, the amount of FDI from Europe to America equaled and even surpassed that 
from America to Europe. Consequently, European multinational corporations are now on a 
par with their US-based counterparts, in terms of global turnover and financial power. If 
during the first post-war decades the prevailing sentiment in Europe vis-à-vis the great 
potential of certain American giants like IBM, IT&T, Exxon or American Express was fear, 
the present criticism is focused preponderantly on macroeconomic aspects. The predilection 
of those who go around accusing America is the manner (considered onerous) in which the 
administration and the Fed understand to “manage” the global economic equilibrium. From 
this perspective, the huge current account deficit of the United States is often interpreted, not 
as a counterweight to the mercantilist-type policy of many other countries – especially China 
and its smaller South-Eastern neighbors, which managed to accumulate huge amounts of 
reserves lately – but as a means by which the Americans are trying to get the largest slice of 
the globalization pie for themselves. The United States are being accused for pursuing a 
macroeconomic policy based on high trade imbalances and a systematic gap between 
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“Americans are often chided for spending too much and saving too little”.
8 ”The world 
produces increasingly more because America needs to consume more. There is no balance 
between America’s exports and imports. The nation that was autonomous and super-
productive after the war has gradually become the hub of a system in which it is exercising 
more its vocation of a consumer and less the one of a producer.” (Todd, 2002)  
Assertions of this kind are genuine samples of European anti-Americanism. The truth 
is America keeps on producing merchandise but evidently, it turns out other types of goods 
than it used to decades ago. Since in the early 1970s the Germans and the Japanese had 
already caught up with the Americans in a number of industrial branches (automobiles, 
chemical engineering, electronics etc.), who would have expected the latter to remain stuck in 
the respective fields? They naturally glided toward other domains and industries, where they 
held a technological advance relative to their European and Asian competitors. In reality, it 
isn’t the world that produces for America to consume (or “exercise its consumer vocation”) 
but exactly the other way around; it is America that must consume for other countries – 
pursuing an exacerbated mercantilism – be able to export their excess production. But this is 
still not the point: should China become the world’s workshop as analysts are foretelling, it is 
not America who will be most affected but very likely, legions of small nations like Romania 
and their neighbors in Eastern Europe, whose labor-intensive industries will be ruined. The 
Chinese tsunami already hit a great number of emerging economies as well as traditional 
industries in Western countries. 
Briefly, the alleged consumption vocation of the Americans is not disruptive but rather 
supportive of global economic equilibrium. This can be inferred, among other things, from the 
delicate position of the dollar: it’s been depreciating against the euro, thereby hurting 
European exporters, but still has a high value relative to the youan, which means that US 
exporters are hurt in their turn. Secondly, US’s macroeconomic policy helps maintain the 
world equilibrium by keeping down interest rates. “America’s low saving and high 
consumption offsets the foreigners’ high saving and low consumption” – argues the chairman 
of the Fed, Ben Bernanke, a former Princeton University economist, who coined this 
phenomenon “the global savings glut”. 
9 “Heavy saving oil producers and Asian nations had 
helped depress interest rates by keeping financial markets flush with cash.” 
10 This situation is 
nevertheless expected to change in the long run, as emerging markets will be likely to save 
less and spend more. “The logic of the global savings glut suggests that, as the glut dissipates 
over the next few decades and thereby reduces the net supply of financial capital from 
emerging-countries, real interest rates should rise.”
11  
ANTI-AMERICANISM: A DISGUISE FOR ANTI-LIBERALISM 
If the American model is rejected, what can we say about the European model of 
capitalism? What kind of a model could Europeans oppose to America’s? Unfortunately, this 
is hardly the case because there are several such models in practice, Europe being a big 
diversity “garden”. Institutional aspects that define various organizational patterns bear a deep 
national imprint, making any comparison with the US system difficult. “If countries possess 
significant institutional specificities, does it imply that each one represents a different 
model?” (Amable, 2004)  
The answer is: maybe yes, maybe no; we couldn’t possibly know for sure. What we do 
know though, with pretty much certainty, is that America has so far outperformed Europe 
(and still ranks ahead of Europe) in a great number of domains; this mere fact – which 
Europeans generally admit – should strengthen (not weaken) confidence in the American 
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model. If things are happening otherwise, there must be a psychological factor that prevents 
Europeans from judging objectively in this respect.  
In fact, Europeans’ anti-Americanism, despite its historical roots and whatever its 
political motivations has always been used as a masque designed to dissimulate anti-
liberalism (Revel, 2002), especially in big countries such as France, Germany, Italy etc., 
where popular resistance to economic and social reforms is toughest. Beyond its diversity of 
forms, European capitalism looks like a “hard nut to crack”; it is sclerotic and idiosyncratic. It 
is primarily for this reason that the American economic system is considered a threat rather 
than a solution.  
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